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The adoption of explicit or implicit inflation targets by many central banks, and 
the low stable rates of inflation that have ensued, raise the question of how inflation 
affects market efficiency.  The goal of the International Wage Flexibility Project (IWFP) 
—a consortium of over forty researchers with access to micro level earnings data for 16 
countries—is to provide microeconomic evidence on the costs and benefits of inflation in 
the labor market.  The results are intended to inform researchers as well as monetary and 
regulatory policymakers who are interested in labor markets or the impact of inflation.  
We study three market imperfections that may cause the rate of inflation to affect labor 
market efficiency. They are:   
•  Nominal wages may be rigid downward because of the presence of substantial 
resistance to nominal wage cuts, most often attributed to money illusion, fairness 
considerations, nominal minimum wages or nominal contracts (Keynes 1936; 
Slichter and Luedicke 1957; Tobin 1972; Akerlof, Dickens and Perry 1996).  
Under low inflation, such rigidity means that more workers have wage freezes 
and fewer workers experience wage cuts than would be the case otherwise, 
leading to increased wage pressure and higher unemployment.  In this case, higher 
inflation could ameliorate the negative consequences of nominal wage rigidity. 
•  Alternatively, if the resistance to wage cuts is informed and concerted enough to 
prevent real wage cuts, for example owing to the impact of union bargaining or 
wage indexation, wages may exhibit downward real rigidity. In this case, higher 
inflation would not ameliorate the problems associated with downward rigidity.  
Only higher productivity growth, by providing scope for higher growth in real 
wages, can reduce the unemployment caused by a real wage floor. 
•  Finally, market participants may have incomplete information about inflation and 
productivity changes—the fundamental drivers of aggregate nominal wage 
growth.  Thus, wage changes may be subject to uncertainty-induced errors or 
adjustment lags (Groshen and Schweitzer 1999, 2000).  If wages behave like 
goods’ prices under uncertainty, higher inflation will be associated with more 
frequent wage changes, higher search costs, and greater uncertainty about the 
future path (Sheshinski and Weiss 1977; Friedman 1977; Vining and Elwertowski 
1976).  Conversely, low inflation will minimize the costs associated with 
uncertainty-induced errors and adjustment lags.  
In short, inflation can “grease” the wheels of economic adjustment in the labor 
market by relieving the constraint imposed by downward nominal wage rigidity, but not 
if there is also substantial downward real wage rigidity. At the same time, inflation can 
throw “sand” in the wheels of economic adjustment by degrading the value of price   3
signals. A number of recent studies suggest that wage rigidity is much more important for 
business cycles and monetary policy than previously believed (see Erceg, Henderson and 
Levin, 2000, Smets and Wouters, 2003, and Hall, 2005). Thus, our results on how wage 
rigidity and other labor market imperfections vary between countries and how they are 
affected by the rate of inflation should be of considerable value in formulating monetary 
policy and conducting related research.  
To investigate these imperfections, the IWFP convened thirteen country teams 
plus a central analysis team that computed wage change distributions locally and then 
analyzed them jointly.  The country teams have access to large panels of European or US 
data on individuals’ wage or earnings.  The countries include most of Europe (large and 
small, north and south, euro and non-euro area countries).  In all, the IWFP applied a 
common protocol to 31 distinct panel datasets that contain over 27 million workers’ wage 
changes, resulting in a unique cross-country panel dataset with 360 dataset-years of wage 
rigidity measures. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  First, we briefly review the empirical literature. 
Next, we describe our data and empirical approach.  We then establish that wage changes 
show substantial dispersion that rises with the rate of wage inflation, as predicted by 
grease and sand effects.  Next, we examine histograms of wage changes for the particular 
asymmetries and spikes that are characteristic of downward real and nominal wage 
rigidity.  This yields estimates of the prevalence of both types of wage rigidity for each 
dataset and year that we then analyze for insight into the causes and consequences of 
those rigidities. Finally, we examine the linkage between wage change dispersion and 
inflation for evidence of errors and adjustment lags (sand effects).    4
 
I.  Previous studies and the IWFP approach 
The IWFP unites and advances three largely distinct strands of research on wage 
changes.  Of these, only downward nominal wage rigidity has been extensively studied 
before. Furthermore, with few exceptions these studies focus on evidence for a single 
country, so they cannot take advantage of cross-country comparisons to measure or 
explain wage rigidities. 
a. Downward nominal wage rigidity – grease effects  
Taken at face value, the many studies of U.S. and Canadian wages show 
conflicting evidence of the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity (see reviews in 
Camba-Mendez, García and Rodríquez-Palenzuela, 2003 and Holden, 2004).  Almost all 
rigidity studies examine distributions of wage changes over several years.  They gauge 
wage rigidity using distributional measures such as the concentration of wage freezes 
(often called the “spike at zero”), the asymmetry caused by the “missing” wage cuts that 
have been constrained to be wage freezes, and the extent to which more inflation reduces 
the asymmetry and the height of the spike.  Inflation’s relaxation of the constraints 
imposed by downward nominal wage rigidity is often called the “grease” effect.  
On close examination, the apparently conflicting evidence is largely due to a 
different treatment of mismeasurement in wages. Wages can be measured inaccurately 
for several reasons. Reporting error is likely to bias micro data measures of rigidity 
towards finding too little rigidity, because it produces spurious variability in wage   5
changes and false wage "cuts".
2 Similarly, many studies use earnings data divided by 
hours worked to construct a measure of wages.  Earnings include fluctuations in other 
parts of compensation (for example, overtime work paid at bonus rates) that can disguise 
the rigidity of the base wage. Data on hours worked may also contain errors that can also 
be a source of spurious fluctuations in a constructed measure of wages.   
The subset of studies (including Altonji and Devereux 2000; Akerlof, Dickens 
and Perry 1996 and Gottschalk forthcoming) on the U.S. that focuses on the base wage
3 
and take proper account of reporting errors are quite consistent.  These papers find a clear 
pattern of substantial resistance to nominal wage cuts in the U.S.
4  Specifically, they find 
a large number of workers receiving wage freezes and very few workers whose wages are 
cut in nominal terms.  
International comparisons offer a key route for investigation of the relative 
importance, causes and consequences of rigidity.  However, differences in data and 
methods among independent micro studies can confound attempts to compare rigidities 
among countries.  Three studies using high quality British data (Barwell and Schweitzer 
2005, Nickel and Quintini 2003 and Smith 2000) find considerably less resistance to 
nominal wage cuts in the U.K. than in the U.S. or Canada.  Fehr and Goette (2005) use 
                                                 
2 A validation study of the Current Population Survey, which uses questions very similar to those in the 
surveys analyzed for the IWFP, find that only about 55% of people correctly report their earnings (Bound 
and Krueger, 1991). 
3 Some have argued that the more comprehensive measures of compensation are appropriate for studying 
rigidity. We believe a focus on base wages is appropriate because if base wages are highly rigid (in either 
real or nominal terms), then circumventing those effects by varying other types of compensation is likely 
to be costly. Furthermore, many changes in other aspects of compensation are not voluntary, such as 
when a hike in insurance premiums raises employer costs for the same package of benefits. Such changes 
may occur, but they may not mean that employers have the ability to make such changes to what 
employees receive. Finally, Lebow et al.’s (2003) study of the U.S. Employment Cost Index, finds no 
evidence that firms circumvent rigidity in base wages by changing other types of compensation.   6
error correction techniques on administrative and survey data, along with personnel data, 
in Switzerland and find considerable downward nominal wage rigidity—more similar to 
the level observed in the U.S. than in the U.K. Two studies of cross-country variation 
during the mid 1990s using the European Community Household Panel (Dessy 2005; and 
Knoppik and Beissinger 2005) find that nominal rigidity varies considerably across 
countries. Finally, using industry level data for 19 OECD countries, Holden and 
Wulfsberg (2005) also find significant downward nominal wage rigidity that is more 
prevalent when unemployment is low, union density is high, and employment protection 
is strict.  
In a study using U.S. data, Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996) assess the impact of 
downward nominal wage rigidity on unemployment by estimating Phillips curves that 
include a term representing the wage effects of rigidity. The inclusion of this term reveals 
evidence of a long run trade-off between inflation and unemployment at very low rates of 
inflation (less than 3%).  They find that only during the Great Depression was inflation 
sufficiently low in the U.S. for downward nominal wage rigidity to increase 
unemployment by more than a percentage point. By contrast, Fortin (1996), Djoudad and 
Sargent (1997), and Dickens (2001) find large effects in Canada in the 1990s when 
inflation was low for an extended period.  However, application of this method to several 
European countries (Dickens 2001) does not provide consistent evidence of a long-run 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment as would be expected if downward 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Other consistent support is found in studies that use interviews of market participants (see Kaufman 1984; 
Blinder and Choi 1990; and Bewley 1999) or analyze personnel files (see Altonji and Deveraux 2000 and 
Wilson 1999) which are less prone to error than survey data.   7
nominal rigidity were important in wage setting. One explanation for this result could be 
the presence of real rigidity in these countries.  
b. Downward real wage rigidity 
There has been little study of downward real wage rigidity in a formulation that 
parallels downward nominal wage rigidity, as is done here.  Nevertheless, many 
European observers believe that their labor market institutions (such as high unionization, 
wage indexation, and coordinated bargaining) protect the real wages of workers, rather 
than their nominal wages.  Helping to fill this void, several recent micro data studies that 
use a methodology developed for an earlier phase of the IWFP find varying degrees of 
downward real rigidity in the U.K., Finland, Italy and other European countries.
5  
In addition, there have been several attempts to use macro data to assess a related, 
but distinct concept, namely the extent to which real and nominal wage changes are 
insensitive to unemployment or the business cycle (for example, see Alogoskoufis and 
Manning 1988; Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 1991; and Blanchard and Summers 1986).
6  
If widespread, the real rigidity that we investigate here could produce insensitivity to 
fundamentals, although it is not necessary for such insensitivity.  
c. Adjustment lags and errors--sand effects 
Few studies have examined the degree to which increased inflation distorts wage 
signals in labor markets. Instead, studies have emphasized such problems in product 
markets.  In the only exception of which we are aware, Groshen and Schweitzer (1999 
                                                 
5 See Barwell and Schweitzer (2004), Bauer, Bonin, and Sunde (2003), Böckerman, Laaksonen and 
Vainiomäki (2003), Dessy (2005), and Devicienti, Maida and Sestito (2005). The methodology used in 
these studies is not used here because some identifying assumptions proved invalid in some of the 
countries.   8
and 2000) note that both downward nominal wage rigidity and inflation uncertainty (that 
rises with the level of inflation) imply that the dispersion of wage changes should 
increase with inflation. Increasing inflation should reduce the concentration of wage 
changes at zero that is caused by downward nominal wage rigidity, while more errors in 
wage setting will raise the dispersion of wage changes regardless of the effects of rigidity. 
Groshen and Schweitzer find increasing variance of wage changes with increased 
inflation and implement a method for disentangling the two effects in explaining that 
relationship.  
d. Design of the IWFP  
The IWFP has developed a new approach to measuring these three imperfections 
– downward nominal rigidity (grease), downward real rigidity, and sand effects – that is 
based on the different effects they have on the dispersion and symmetry of wage changes 
and takes careful account of the biases introduced by measurement error. The features for 
which we test are summarized Table 1.  Each row lists an imperfection and its predicted 
effects on the distribution of wage changes.   
The first key prediction (column 2) is that grease and sand effects both imply that 
the dispersion of wage changes rises with inflation (under downward nominal rigidity, 
firms are less constrained; if there are informational problems, they make more mistakes 
or have lagged adjustments).  By contrast, in the case of real rigidity, higher inflation may 
simply raise the mean wage change without affecting the dispersion of wages—although 
it could raise dispersion if higher inflation leads to more disagreement about the expected 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Another related branch of the literature measures insensitivity of individual real wages to local 
unemployment (see Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994 and 2005 and Sanz-de-Galdeano and Turunen, 
2006).    9
rate of inflation.  Then wage setters expecting high inflation would have higher wage 
growth than those who expect low inflation.  
Second, with regard to symmetry and spikes (column 3 of Table 1), both nominal 
and real downward rigidity should lead to high concentrations of workers with nominal 
or real wage freezes (that is, with wage changes equal to zero or to expected inflation, 
respectively) and correspondingly fewer workers with increases below those rates.  By 
contrast, more errors or lags in wage setting will increase the variance of the observed 
wage change distribution, but there is no reason to believe they will affect the 
distribution’s symmetry.   
 
II. Empirical approach and data  
a. Empirical approach 
The empirical approach used by the IWFP (called “distributed micro analysis”) 
has country teams apply common analytical protocols to datasets for their countries 
locally.  They use their expertise with the relevant data, history and institutions, while 
observing the confidentiality restrictions under which they are granted access to the 
information.  Statistics generated by the protocols for each dataset are used by teams as 
the basis of country-specific analysis and also collected into a panel dataset for combined 
analysis. 
This strategy has several virtues.  First, heterogeneous country environments 
provide important variation for analysis of the impact of policy and institutions.  Second, 
the application of common, flexible protocols allows for better comparison among 
countries than is typically available for meta-analysis of micro results.  Third, the use of 
multiple data sources provides insight into the impact of data characteristics on estimated   10
outcomes. Fourth, researchers who are familiar with the data, the country, and its 
institutions are best able to apply a protocol to the data properly and to interpret the 
results appropriately.  Since the application of the protocol to a particular dataset and 
country often requires some adjustment, collaboration between the project directors and 
the country teams ensures a good balance between the demands of uniformity and respect 
for local variation.  Finally, local application of the protocols allows inclusion of 
confidential data that would be inaccessible otherwise. 
b. Data 
The first goal of the IWFP was to examine the relative importance of sand and 
grease effects across a number of European countries and the U.S.  As such, availability 
of data appropriate to this task was the main determinant of participation in the study.  
The countries included, and the broad characteristics of the datasets used, are described in 
Table 2.  To augment the datasets analyzed by country teams, the central analysis team 
obtained access to the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), which adds 
another 12 datasets and 3 additional countries.
7   
The 31 datasets analyzed for the project cover over 27 million wage changes and 
are diverse with respect to source, coverage, years, industrial sector, occupations covered, 
and definitions of variables of interest (see Table 2).  The many differences among these 
types of data add richness as well as potentially confounding factors to the analysis below.   
                                                 
7 The ECHP is a longitudinal database drawn from a survey of households in 15 EU countries; it includes 
detailed information about individual characteristics, including earnings (for more information on the first 
three waves of ECHP data see Peracchi 2002). Wages are reported as net earnings (including overtime 
pay and bonuses) in the previous month (except for France and Finland, where net earnings are derived 
from reported gross data using a net/gross ratio).  We exclude the series for Spain, Luxembourg and 
Sweden due to data limitations.   11
The three main sources of data are employment registers, household surveys and 
employer surveys.  An employment register (maintained by a government for the 
administration of taxes and/or benefits) covers all workers in a specified universe and has 
minimal reporting error.  Some country teams work with random samples drawn from the 
registers, while others analyze the entire census.  Household surveys sample from the 
universe of all workers, but typically rely on respondent recall, and so they are subject to 
both sampling and reporting error.  By contrast, employer salary surveys typically cover 
all workers in the occupations and firms in their purview and draw their data from payroll 
records, but vary considerably in how many occupations or firms they cover.  The 
employer surveys in the IWFP are particularly comprehensive because they are 
conducted by national employer associations and are used extensively for policy and 
managerial purposes.   
Datasets also vary in terms of the compensation measures available.  Some 
datasets have base wages.  However, most wage information in the IWFP is based on 
monthly or annual labor earnings (that is, including base wage, overtime pay, and 
bonuses).  In those cases, we use a proxy for base wage: earnings divided by the best 
available measure of hours worked.  Hours worked information is available for most of 
the data sources.  
Samples are restricted to workers who did not switch employer in order to 
concentrate on rigidity in ongoing employment relationships. In addition, large outliers in   12
wage changes
8 are excluded as they likely reflect wage reporting errors or unidentified 
job changes. 
The time periods covered by the different datasets vary, with some starting in the 
early 1970s and others running through the beginnings of the 2000s, with an average of 
twelve years per dataset.  In total, there are 360 dataset-year observations, including 
observations from multiple datasets for twelve countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K. 
 
III. The dispersion of wage changes 
We begin with the simple scatter plot of the standard deviation of log (percentage) 
wage changes against the rate of wage inflation for each year for each dataset in our study 
shown in Figure 1a.  Both the magnitude and range of these standard deviations are 
remarkable. To some extent, the magnitude and range are artifacts of a high average level 
of measurement error and of variation across datasets in the extent of error. But as Figure 
1b shows, even when the average standard deviation for each dataset is subtracted from 
the standard deviations for the years observed (which should remove persistent 
differences due to dataset measurement error characteristics), there is still substantial 
variation.  
Further, the linear relationships plotted in the two graphs suggest that inflation 
plays a role in determining the extent of variation, as we would expect. The magnitude of 
inflation’s impact on wage change dispersion is modest.  A two standard deviation rise in 
                                                 
8 Increases of more than 60% in wage data or 100% in annual income data and cuts of more than 35% in 
wage data or 85% in income data were eliminated.   13
inflation (5.7 percentage points) raises the dispersion of wage changes by about half of a 
standard deviation (or 2.1 percentage points).  
Histograms of wage changes offer a way to identify the grease, real rigidity and 
sand effects more directly.  For example, Figure 2a presents the histogram of percentage 
wage changes for wage earners in the U.S. in 1988. It has four noteworthy features: 
•  The histogram illustrates the substantial variation in wage changes among 
individuals that was shown to be common across all countries and years in 
Figures 1a and 1b.   
•  There is a large concentration of workers at exactly zero wage change 
(that is, with wage freezes) suggesting the presence of downward nominal 
wage rigidity.  
•  The histogram reveals notable asymmetry; the mean wage change is 1.2 
percentage points greater than the median.  This asymmetry is largely due 
to the absence of workers with wage cuts and the piling up of workers 
with wage freezes.  If the workers with wage freezes are spread among the 
wage-cut bins in proportion to the workers who actually received wage 
cuts, the difference between the mean and the median drops to only 0.4 
percentage points.  The boxes above the distribution to the left of the 
median show the reflection of the upper tail of the distribution.  It is clear 
that a substantial number of workers are missing from the lower (wage-
cut) tail; they are concentrated in the wage-freeze spike at zero instead.  
•  The distribution of wage changes shown would not be Gaussian or normal 
even if the wage-freeze spike at zero and the missing wage-cuts were 
ignored.  The distribution is notably more peaked and has somewhat fatter 
tails than does a normal distribution with the same median and standard 
deviation. 
For a clear contrast, consider Figure 2b, which shows a wage change histogram 
for Belgium in 1979.  While it initially looks similar to Figure 2a, the horizontal axis 
reveals that the spike is located in the range of 4 to 5%, rather than at zero in a year when 
price inflation was 4.5%.  In this diagram, there are almost no “extra” wage freezes (that 
is, almost no spike at zero) and no evidence of a lack of wage cuts compared to low wage 
growth.  If Figure 2a suggests downward nominal wage rigidity, Figure 2b suggests   14
downward real wage rigidity and shows how the presence of strong downward real wage 
rigidity can make downward nominal rigidity less relevant.   
Analysis of the 360 dataset-year histograms in the IWFP yields strong, consistent 
evidence that wage changes are not normally distributed.  Wage change distributions 
consistently show the following features: 
•  Too many people have wage freezes, creating a large spike at zero.   
•  Workers’ wage changes are tightly clustered around the median change, 
making the distributions much more peaked than the normal.   
•  More people have more extreme wage changes than predicted by normality 
(that is, the distributions have fat tails).  
Appendix A details the analysis that reveals these features and also shows that 
fitted two-sided Weibull distributions provide a much better fit for wage changes than do 
fitted normal distributions.  These important regularities underlie the design of the 
protocol used by the IWFP. 
 
IV. Methodology 
This section describes the methodology used to assess histograms for evidence of 
the three effects under investigation.  First we explain the construction of some simple 
measures of downward real and nominal rigidity and of inflation-induced errors and lags 
in wage adjustment.  We then discuss the potential problems that measurement error 
causes in these metrics.  Many of the statistical measures used in past studies may be 
subject to important biases caused by errors associated with data collection procedures.  
Finally, we describe a new two-step estimation procedure developed by the IWFP to 
address these biases and render results more comparable across different datasets.   
a. Simple measures of downward nominal and real wage rigidity   15
To measure real or nominal wage rigidity in a particular year, we can construct 
metrics that provide answers to two distinct questions:   
•  What fraction of workers who would normally receive a wage cut in the 
absence of downward rigidity will instead receive a real or nominal wage 
freeze?  
•  What is the impact of the rigidity on the average nominal wage change in that 
year?   
We begin by positing that the “notional” percentage wage change distribution, i.e. 
the distribution of wage changes that would prevail in the absence of downward rigidity, 
is symmetric.  Thus, in the absence of rigidities, the mean wage change equals the median 
wage change.  In fact, this appears to be the case.  We find symmetry in the wage-change 
distribution between zero and two times the median when inflation is high in countries 
with little or no real rigidity.  As we will see later, a model that assumes that the only 
deviations from symmetry are due to downward real and nominal rigidity does a very 
good job of describing the actual wage change distribution in nearly every country in 
nearly every year.   
To answer the first question, in the case of downward nominal wage rigidity we 
proceed as follows. Suppose a fraction n of workers is protected from wage cuts by 
downward nominal rigidity.  The fraction of workers whose wages do not change will 
equal the fraction of workers in the left tail of the notional distribution below zero times n.  
This means that we can estimate the fraction n as the ratio of the number of workers with 
a wage freeze to the total at risk of a cut (that is, those receiving no wage change plus 
those receiving a cut).  
By how much does nominal rigidity raise the average wage in the true distribution 
above that of the notional distribution?  Assuming that the median wage change is greater   16
than or equal to zero (as it is in every year in every country in all of our datasets) 
downward nominal wage rigidity will not affect the median wage change, but it will raise 
the mean. Assuming that all workers who would have received wage cuts are equally 
likely to be subject to downward nominal wage rigidity, the mean will increase by the 
absolute value of the average wage cut times the fraction of workers receiving no wage 
change.  This measure, which has been called the “wage sweep-up,” has been used to 
estimate the impact of downward nominal wage rigidity.  
Turning to downward real rigidity, we begin by noting that if the expected rate of 
inflation is below the median notional wage change (as is likely if productivity is 
growing), downward real wage rigidity will also raise the mean without affecting the 
median wage change.  Thus (all else equal), the rise in the mean wage change due to the 
combined effect of downward nominal and downward real wage rigidity is equal to the 
difference between the mean and the median. So, we can estimate the wage impact of 
downward real wage rigidity by subtracting the impact of downward nominal rigidity 
(that we estimate as described above) from the difference between the mean and the 
median.  
Finally, we need a measure of the fraction of the workforce susceptible to 
downward real wage rigidity that is analogous to our measure of downward nominal 
wage rigidity. Unfortunately, not all agents in the labor market share the same expected 
rate of inflation, so we will not see the extreme spikes we observe around zero to identify 
nominal rigidity.  Thus, we take an indirect approach:  backing out the number from the 
wage impact.    17
The wage impact of downward real wage rigidity is equal to the fraction of 
workers receiving real wage freezes multiplied by how much their wages were affected. 
Thus, dividing our estimate of the wage effect of real rigidity by the difference between 
expected inflation and the average wage change of workers who received a raise of less 
than expected inflation yields an estimate of the fraction of workers who receive real 
wage freezes.
9  To arrive at the fraction of people potentially subject to real rigidity (r) 
we divide that fraction by the fraction of workers at risk for a real wage freeze; the 
fraction of workers with notional wage changes less than the expected rate of inflation.  
To take into account the variation across agents in the expected rate of inflation we 
assume that half of the people who receive real wage freezes will receive wage changes 
above the average expected inflation and half will receive wage changes below this value.  
Thus, the fraction at risk equals the fraction of people receiving less than our estimate of 
expected inflation plus half the people who we believe are affected by downward real 
wage rigidity. We compute  
(1)  r = f / A = f (1 - ½ r)/ B = f / (B + ½ f ),   
since B = (1 - ½ r) A, 
where r is the fraction of workers at risk for downward real rigidity, f is the fraction of 
workers receiving real wage freezes, A is the fraction of workers with notional wage 
changes below the average expected rate of inflation, and B is the fraction of workers 
observed to have wage changes lower than the expected rate of inflation.  
 
 
                                                 
9 We estimate expected inflation from a simple linear regression of the current year's inflation on the   18
b. Inflation-induced adjustment lags and errors 
Examination of histograms also yields evidence of the presence of inflation-
induced lags and errors in wage changes.  Workers with above-median wage raises are 
normally not affected by downward real or nominal rigidity. All else held equal, we 
would expect more errors or a greater frequency of errors to be associated with higher 
variance of the notional wage change distribution. Downward rigidity will distort the 
variance in the lower tail of the distribution, but usually the upper tail will be unaffected. 
We thus compute the standard deviation of the notional wage change distribution as our 
measure and construct it by taking the square-root of the average squared difference 
between the median and observations above the median in our observed wage change 
histograms.  
c. Issues with the simple measures and description of alternative MMM estimates 
The simple measures described above are potentially subject to several problems:   
•  Wages may be mismeasured due to response errors or, if wages are imputed 
from earnings and hours, due to contamination with other components of 
compensation or with inaccurate information on hours worked. 
•  The measure of downward nominal rigidity may be confounded with the 
effects of symmetric nominal rigidity due to rounding errors or employers’ 
unwillingness to give very small wage changes of either sign.  
•  The spike at zero in annual income data may be smaller than that for wage 
changes since people must go two years without any wage changes for their 
annual income to show no change. 
•  Our estimate of expected price inflation may not match the expectations of 
wage-setting agents. 
To deal with these issues, the IWFP created a set of comparable estimates that 
correct for measurement error, allow for symmetric nominal rigidity, model the link 
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between wage determination and annual income, and estimate the expected rate of 
inflation from the observed wage change data.   
This section briefly describes this new method for estimating rigidity, which we 
call the Mixed Method of Moments (MMM) approach.  For full detail, see Appendix B.  
The method has two main elements: a correction for measurement error (that estimates 
distributions of “true” wage changes from observed ones) and estimation of rigidities (by 
comparing true wage changes with notional ones). 
Our correction technique can be used on a variety of datasets without strong 
assumptions about the distribution of wage changes.
10 Consider two histograms: one 
showing the distribution of true wage changes and one showing the distribution of 
observed wage changes, where measurement error may pollute the observed data.  Given 
the distribution of measurement error, one can write a transformation matrix that converts 
the histogram of true wage changes into the histogram of observed wage changes. If that 
transformation matrix were known, the histogram of the true distribution could be 
recovered by multiplying the vector of observed frequencies times the inverse of the 
transformation matrix.  This relationship amounts to a set of moment conditions equal to 
the number of cells minus 1in the true wage change histogram.  
In order to obtain this transformation matrix, we must assume a form for the 
distribution of the measurement error and estimate its parameters. The intuition behind 
our method for estimating the parameters of the error distribution is straightforward.  
Measurement error in wage levels introduces negative serial correlation into wage 
                                                 
10 Previous approaches to correcting for measurement error make strong functional form assumptions about 
the distribution of true wage changes (Altonji and Devereux, 2000; Fehr and Goette, 2005), or require   20
changes, and that negative serial correlation can be related directly to the frequency and 
variance of errors. Given an estimate of the true wage change distribution, and the 
distribution of errors, predictions can be made about the frequency with which people 
who receive wage changes larger than one value in one period will receive wage changes 
smaller than a lower value in the next period or vice versa.  These relations yield several 
additional moments that allow us to identify the parameters of the error distribution. 
The large number of parameters in the true wage change distribution makes the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) approach impractical for estimating the error 
correction model.  Instead, given guesses of the parameters of the error distribution, we 
solve for the true wage change distribution from the observed wage change distribution, 
concentrate it out of the remaining moment conditions, and use GMM to estimate the 
remaining parameters of the error distribution.  
Two features of this estimator are noteworthy.  First, the estimator makes only 
very limited assumptions about distribution of true nominal wage changes (i.e., that it can 
be represented by a histogram with 76 or 186 cells, depending on the type of dataset).  
Therefore, the estimator is not biased towards finding one particular form of wage 
rigidity over another.  Second, application of this correction strategy to IWFP datasets 
provides convincing evidence that the process works as intended.
11  For example, the U.S. 
PSID and the ECHP are survey datasets where wages are reported with a great deal of 
error, which our method detects.  A few of our datasets (notably the Finnish employer 
                                                                                                                                                 
high-frequency data on wage changes (Gottschalk, forthcoming) that are not available in most of the 
countries we study. 
11 In addition, Gottschalk’s (forthcoming) method for estimating true wage changes also yields an error and 
a true wage series for each individual in his dataset. We tested all of our assumptions on those two series 
and could not reject any of them.   21
survey data and the German administrative data) accurately measure a base wage concept 
and our method yields negligible corrections in these cases. 
After correcting for measurement error, we use GMM to fit a simple model of 
wage changes to the error-corrected wage- or income-change histograms for each dataset 
year.
12  We assume that, in the absence of rigidity, log wage changes have a symmetric 
two-sided Weibull notional distribution (see Appendix A for further explanation of the 
choice of the two-sided Weibull distribution). We estimate all three parameters of the 
notional distribution in each year, as well as productivity increases and the mean and 
standard dispersion of expected inflation.   
We use that notional distribution and expected inflation estimates to produce 
alternative estimates of the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity (n) and of 
downward real wage rigidity (r), as well as estimates of the dispersion of notional wage 
changes that we can examine for evidence of errors (sand effects) in wage setting.  The 
procedure also produces an estimate of the extent of symmetrical nominal rigidity that we 
do not consider here. 
 
V. Rigidity estimates  
When we apply the methods described above to estimating rigidity for each 
dataset for each year, we find a great deal of variation across time and datasets. Before 
proceeding with further analysis, we first compare the results obtained from the simple 
and MMM methods and examine the validity of the variation in wage rigidity.  
                                                 
12 The IWFP has experimented with a number of other methods for identifying differing degrees of rigidity 
(Dickens and Goette 2004) requiring less restrictive assumptions. The other methods were judged inferior   22
Note that each method produces estimates of the extent of downward nominal 
wage rigidity (n) and of downward real wage rigidity (r). In concept, these measures vary 
between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates perfect flexibility (no one is constrained) and 1 
indicates full rigidity (all workers are potentially constrained).  
a. Comparison of simple and MMM cross-country estimates and other validation 
exercises 
Focusing first on cross-country evidence, the two sets of estimates provide similar 
results.  Country averages of the two sets of estimates are closely correlated, more so for 
the measures of real wage rigidity (with a correlation coefficient of 0.68) than the 
measures of nominal wage rigidity (0.55).  On average across all countries, the MMM 
measure points to somewhat higher nominal rigidity (with an estimated fraction of 0.36 
workers being potentially subject to nominal rigidity) than the simple measure (0.28), and 
somewhat lower real rigidity (0.27 versus 0.25 for the simple measures).  This is to be 
expected as the MMM estimates correct for measurement error which causes an 
underestimation of the true size of the spike at zero (the basis for our simple estimate of 
n).  On the other hand, measurement error has almost no effect on the difference between 
the mean and median wage change, which is the basis of our estimate of the fraction of 
workers who are potentially subject to downward real wage rigidity. 
Regressions (not reported here) of the two sets of estimates of r and n on country 
indicators show that country effects are jointly significant in both sets, even with controls 
                                                                                                                                                 
in that deviations from this more restrictive method seemed to result from shortcomings of the alternative 
methods rather than from failures of the distributional assumptions critical to the method used here.   23
for a full set of dataset characteristics.
13 Dataset characteristics explain an important part 
(27 percent) of the variation in the simple measure of nominal wage rigidity, while they 
explain only a minor part (less than 5 percent) of the variation in the MMM measure of 
nominal rigidity (n).  This suggests that the error correction procedure does a good job of 
removing the influence of dataset characteristics when measuring nominal rigidity.  In the 
case of real rigidity, dataset characteristics explain less than 5 percent of the variation in 
both cases.   
For further validation, we can compare these measures to those from other studies 
and between different datasets in our study.  We find that the MMM estimates of nominal 
wage rigidity are positively correlated with measures from two other cross-national 
studies (Knoppik and Beissinger 2005, and Holden and Wulfsberg, 2005) that use 
different methodologies to estimate the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity 
(Figure 3).  It is worth noting that the correlation between our simple measures of 
nominal rigidity and the results in Knoppik and Beissinger (2005), also not corrected for 
measurement error, is even larger (0.86) than the correlation with the MMM measures 
shown in the Figure 3. 
In countries where we have r and n estimates from the ECHP and another dataset, 
the two are strongly positively correlated (0.53 for both r and n) when we correct for 
measurement error using MMM.  Correlations using our simple measures are weaker  
(-0.12 for r and 0.26 for n). This provides further evidence of the impact of data 
characteristics on the simple estimates of rigidity, since ECHP data differs in a number of 
                                                 
13 The dataset characteristics include the average autocovariance of wage changes and indicator variables 
for the following:  census vs. sample, survey vs. administrative records, earnings vs. wage data, whether   24
ways from most of the other datasets (see Table 2). However, since the paired estimates 
cover different time periods, and in some cases different types of workers, we do not 
expect a perfect correlation.  
In sum, we conclude that the MMM measures detect patterns of rigidities that are 
similar to the simple measures and those obtained in previous studies, but preferable 
because they are less prone to bias from measurement error.  Overall, we consider these 
results to be very supportive of the reliability of our MMM country average estimates.  
Thus, the analysis below uses only the preferred MMM estimators.  As a check, we have 
performed all the exercises below for the simple measures and find similar, albeit usually 
weaker effects in each case. 
b. Cross-country comparisons of rigidity 
We find considerable variation in the extent of both real and nominal rigidity 
across countries when we average the MMM measures for each country across all 
datasets and time (see Figure 4).  Estimates of the fraction of workers potentially affected 
by downward nominal wage rigidity (n) range from 9% in Germany to 66% in Portugal, 
while the comparable range for real rigidity (r) is 3% in Greece to 52% in Sweden. 
Furthermore, countries with higher nominal rigidity tend to show less real rigidity 
(correlation=-0.25).  Overall, the cross-country variation points to a possibly important 
role of differences in institutional characteristics of the labor market as a determinant of 
the extent of rigidity.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the country team ran the annual earnings protocol vs. the wage protocol, whether the data was drawn   25
c.  Time-series variation in rigidity estimates 
The MMM estimates of rigidity vary considerably over time for many countries.  
We expect this time-series variation to be of considerable interest in future work.  For 
now, we focus on the implications of the time-series variation for validation of our cross-
country means.  
Validation of the variation of our country estimates over time is difficult; 
nevertheless, they do receive support in a number of cases.  Our ability to validate 
systematically is limited because we have no comparable alternative cross-country 
studies and because there is little or no overlap between the time periods covered by the 
different datasets for the same countries in our study.  
However, some of the notable changes that we observe in our measures of rigidity 
happen at the same time that important institutional changes in the particular countries 
occur.  For example, our estimates of the fraction of workers affected by real wage 
rigidity in the U.S. declines significantly from the 1970s to the mid-1980s and 1990s.  
This decline corresponds to the decline in the role of unions and pattern bargaining in U.S. 
wage setting (Blanchflower and Freeman, 1992). 
In addition, we find that the MMM estimates of r have no detectable relationship 
to inflation, as should be the case if wage-setting institutions change slowly.  By contrast, 
under some specifications MMM estimates of n have a weakly statistically significant 
relationship to the level of inflation that begs further investigation.
14   
                                                                                                                                                 
from the ECHP, and whether hours worked were available. 
14 Such a relationship could arise if the error correction procedure was sensitive to the rate of inflation and 
over- or under- compensated when inflation is low.   26
Finally, we note that for several countries our measures of real rigidity show 
volatility over short periods of time that seems implausible.  The likely explanations for 
these anomalies suggest strategies to correct them.  We will implement these 
modifications in the next phase of our analysis in order to exploit the time-series variation 
in our sample.  For now, we focus on country averages, which are robust to these issues.   
 
VI. Correlates of rigidity  
We now explore whether our measures of wage rigidity are associated with labor 
market institutions that are suspected sources of wage rigidity.  We consider the 
following six labor market institutions: strictness of employment protection legislation 
(EPL), union density, collective bargaining coverage, whether minimum wage or wage 
indexation legislation is in place, and the degree of corporatism (an index of bargaining 
coordination and centralization).  Our most robust results are for measures of unionism. 
Figures 5 and 6 show scatter plots of country averages of n and r against six 
measures of labor market institutions.  We see that the index of EPL has a weak, 
statistically insignificant positive correlation with both measures of wage rigidity.  The 
corporatism index—which is a summary measure of centralization and coordination 
bargaining structures—has a statistically insignificant negative correlation with both 
nominal and real rigidity.  
Our measure of indexation is weakly negatively correlated with nominal rigidity 
and positively correlated with real rigidity, though neither relationship is statistically   27
significant.
15  The weakness of both results is not surprising since all indexation regimes 
in our sample provide only partial coverage of the economy.  Also, some countries such 
as Finland and France experience relatively high real rigidity without ever having had 
wage indexation clauses in place. 
The figures also show that countries with higher ratios of minimum wages to 
average wages have modestly higher levels of nominal rigidity and lower levels of real 
rigidity.  However, this result seems to be driven by the contrast between countries with 
substantial collective bargaining but no minimum wages, and those with substantial 
minimum wages.  This suggests that the relationship is only a reflection of the much 
stronger and more robust correlation between unionism and rigidity.  
The strongest results are for union coverage and union density.  Both measures of 
unionism are negatively correlated with nominal rigidity and positively correlated with 
real rigidity (all significant at the 10 percent level in a one-tailed test).  We speculate that 
union representation raises workers’ awareness of the path of their real wages and gives 
them the bargaining power to protect their real wages.  Accordingly, workers become less 
concerned with nominal wage changes.  Alternatively, unions may effectively move their 
members from a regime where their nominal wages were protected to one where they are 
guaranteed some nominal wage increase.  For example, they may threaten to work less 
efficiently under the protection of an incompletely specified nominal wage contract.  
Under these circumstances we would estimate a lower rate of nominal rigidity.  
                                                 
15 For the indexation estimate we exclude Switzerland, which has a prevalent but unusual form of wage 
indexation. Many Swiss employment contracts require a new round of wage negotiations if prices have 
increased by a certain amount since the contract period began.  However, the outcome of these 
negotiations is open, so indexation is not automatic (see Blattner et al. 1993).  If we include Switzerland, 
real rigidity has a weak negative correlation with indexation.   28
The results of our correlation analysis are reinforced by regressions of our time-
varying rigidity measures on measures of labor market institutions.  Here we also include 
time and country dummies.  Union density has a particularly consistent and statistically 
significant positive relationship with the real rigidity measure. 
 
VII. Are these rigidities important?  
We now consider the consequences of wage rigidity.  If downward nominal 
rigidity causes some unemployment at very low rates of inflation, small increases in 
inflation can reduce this joblessness, creating the grease effect.  However, in cases where 
it is real rigidity that reduces employment, and many workers are potentially affected, the 
grease effect of inflation can be mitigated.  To examine the relationship between wage 
rigidity and unemployment we turn to the general equilibrium model of Akerlof, Dickens 
and Perry (1996) that motivates a Phillips curve relation of the form 
(2)  πt = πt
e + c - a Ut + b St + xt + εt. 
In this model, πt is the rate of price inflation at time t, πt
e is the expected rate of 
price inflation, c is a constant, Ut is the unemployment rate, St represents the wage effects 
of rigidity, xt is the effects of supply shocks and εt reflects other unobserved factors 
affecting the rate of inflation.  This relationship implies that  
(3)  Ut = St b/a + [c +xt - (πt - πt
e)]/a + μt. 
The constant b is equal to 1 plus the average mark-up of prices over labor costs. 
Typical estimates of the coefficient a place it between 0.2 and 1.0, so we expect the 
impact of St on unemployment to be greater than 1.0.    29
The wage rigidity variable (St) equals the amount by which nominal wages of 
those constrained by downward rigidity are higher as a result of wage rigidity, multiplied 
by their share of the wage bill.  For each dataset for each year, we approximate St by 
estimating the extent to which wage rigidity raised average wage changes, as compared to 
the notional wage change distribution for that dataset-year.
16   
We estimate equation (2) and equation (3).  In estimating equation (2) we assume 
that the expected rate of inflation is equal to the previous period’s inflation and that the 
effect of supply shocks can be captured by indicator variables for specific events (oil 
shocks) or for all years.  In estimating equation (3), we implicitly assume that expectation 
errors are orthogonal to St by excluding inflation or expectations from the regression. We 
assume that the expected rate of inflation is equal to the previous period's inflation and 
that the effect of supply shocks not orthogonal to the rate of unemployment in the period 
can be captured by indicator variables for specific events. Other shocks become 
regression error. 
We run two specifications for each equation.  All specifications include dataset-
specific intercepts.  The second specification also includes year-specific intercepts to 
control for common supply shocks.  Table 3 presents the results. 
                                                 
16 To be explicit, we compute a numerical estimate of the average notional log wage change conditional on 
the wage change being negative. We also compute the average log wage change conditional on it being 
less than our estimate of the average expected rate of inflation.  The latter average wage change is 
multiplied by a smoothed estimate of the fraction of the workforce potentially subject to downward real 
wage rigidity (r).  Similarly, the former average wage change is multiplied by a smoothed estimate of the 
fraction of the workforce potentially affected by downward nominal rigidity times one minus the fraction 
potentially subject to real rigidity ([1-r]n).  These are summed to obtain to obtain an approximation of St.  
This is only an approximation because the effects of rigidity can accumulate over time if a large fraction 
of the workforce is affected by the rigidity (see Akerlof, Dickens and Perry). This normally unimportant 
effect can be strong during extended spells of low inflation or deflation such as the U.S. Great Depression.   30
In all cases the estimate of the unemployment impact (b/a) is statistically 
significantly greater than zero at least at the 0.1 level, and in all but one case, it is 
significantly greater than 1.  When we separately estimate the effects of real and nominal 
rigidity (in regressions not reported here), some of the estimates are not statistically 
significantly greater than zero, but we can never reject the hypothesis that the 
unemployment effect of a rigidity measure is greater than 1.  Nor can we reject the 
hypothesis that the coefficients on the two measures of the wage impact of rigidity are 
equal.  Also, when we estimate b independent of a in equation (2) (regressions not 
reported), it is always less than the predicted minimum of 1, but we can never reject the 
hypothesis that it is greater than 1.  
Taken together, these results provide moderately strong evidence that inflation 
can lower unemployment in the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity (that is, of 
grease effects), but does not lower unemployment in the presence of downward real wage 
rigidity.   
 
VIII. Adjustment lags and errors (sand effects)  
We turn now to the effects of inflation on adjustment lags and errors in wage 
setting.  Here we try to isolate unintended variation in wage changes by estimating the 
effect of inflation on the notional dispersion of wage changes.   
Our metric of the dispersion of wage changes is the standard deviation of the 
MMM notional wage changes distribution (from which the impact of wage rigidities and 
reporting errors has been removed).  To check validity, we can compare these estimates 
to the standard deviation of wage changes above the median (where the impact of   31
rigidities should be absent).  The correlation between the two measures is indeed high, at 
0.90. 
To assess the relationship between this variability and inflation, we note that over 
time, nominal wage growth will reflect price growth plus productivity growth.  Thus, 
aggregate nominal changes contain three components:  expected inflation, inflation 
surprises and productivity growth.  Accordingly, Table 4 reports the relationship between 
the standard deviation of log wage changes above the median and inflation expectations 
and these three sources of nominal wage growth, all in quadratic form.
17 The coefficients 
on the first-order terms of all three factors are similar in magnitude and statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level (one-tail test), and there is little evidence that these 
effects taper off, as the coefficients on the quadratic terms are not statistically significant.  
These results are consistent with the proposition that higher inflation distorts price signals, 
but do not suggest that unexpected inflation causes more variation than expected inflation. 
To gauge the size of misallocation effects of inflation on the labor market, we 
estimate regressions similar to equations (2) and (3) that include the MMM estimate of 
the standard deviation of the notional wage change distribution as an additional 
independent variable, both with and without the measures of rigidity effects.  Coefficients 
were small and statistically insignificant in nearly all specifications.
18 Of course, the costs 
of inflation need not show up as unemployment, and it is difficult to assess the magnitude 
of the effects without a detailed structural model of firm wage setting.  
 
                                                 
17 We measure expected inflation as a three year moving average of realized inflation rates. Several other 
expectations measures produced similar coefficient estimates, but the standard errors were larger.   32
IX. Conclusion  
The International Wage Flexibility Project has investigated three ways in which 
labor market imperfections interact with inflation.  First, moderate inflation in the 
presence of resistance to nominal wage cuts can “grease” the wheels of relative wage 
adjustment to ongoing shocks and thus improve economic efficiency. Second, widespread 
resistance to real wage cuts can also raise unemployment rates, but in this case inflation 
provides no relief.  Third, inflation can cause distortions in relative wages that lead to 
costly resource misallocations, thus throwing “sand” in the wheels of economic 
adjustment.  While the first effect has been studied extensively, especially in the U.S., the 
other two have not. 
The IWFP investigates these three effects simultaneously using 31 panel datasets 
covering over 27 million wage changes for individual workers in 16 European countries 
and the U.S., incorporating the expertise, data access, and analysis contributed by 13 
country teams.  We find considerable variation in wage changes among workers in the 
same country and year. The variation increases with inflation, as we would expect if 
either downward nominal rigidity (grease effects) or inflation-induced adjustment lags 
and errors (sand effects) were important.  
Applying a new estimator for the prevalence of these three effects, we find 
evidence of both types of rigidity in nearly every country.  Estimates of the fraction of 
workers potentially affected by downward nominal wage rigidity (n) range from 9% in 
Germany to 65% in Portugal while the comparable range for real rigidity (r) is 3% in 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 The coefficients on the rigidity effects variables are virtually unaffected by the inclusion of this variable 
and no substantive conclusions are altered.    33
Greece to 52% in Sweden.  Furthermore, there is some evidence that countries with 
higher nominal rigidity tend to show less real rigidity.  
Our technique and wealth of datasets enable us to explore the impact of data 
features on empirical estimates of wage rigidity and compare our results with those of 
previous studies.  These new measures of downward nominal rigidity are strongly 
correlated with other recent measures derived from industry or individual data.   
Examination of the causes of downward nominal and real wage rigidity suggests 
an important role for the extent of unionization and collective bargaining coverage. Both 
show a consistently positive relationship with the extent of downward real wage rigidity 
and a negative association with downward nominal wage rigidity. This finding suggests 
that collective bargaining focuses workers’ attention on real wages and gives them some 
ability to resist real wage cuts. Other institutional variables that we examined had weaker 
relationships with our measures of rigidity.  
These differences in rigidity across countries may translate into differences in 
unemployment.  Measures of the “wage impact” of downward nominal and real wage 
rigidity (that is, the extent to which workers’ wages are affected in a particular year) are 
positively related to unemployment with statistically significant coefficients of about the 
size predicted by theory. The estimated effects are large.  A one percentage point increase 
in the average wage relative to the notional average wage due to rigidity will cause about 
a 1 to 3 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate.   
Finally, we find evidence that the dispersion of notional wage changes rises with 
inflation (expected or not) and productivity growth.  This rise in notional dispersion is 
consistent with the view that inflation causes more adjustment lags and errors in wage   34
setting.  In addition, we find no evidence of unemployment effects from degradation of 
price signals, so any costs imposed may be on productivity rather than on jobs.  
Our results show that inflation’s interaction with labor markets is multifaceted.  
From a monetary policy standpoint, the beneficial grease effects of inflation (stemming 
from downward nominal wage rigidity) that we and others detect are only part of the 
story.  Another impact of inflation is likely to be detrimental:  we find evidence of 
inflation-induced errors and lagged adjustments, raising the possibility that high inflation 
causes misallocation of resources.  Third, we find that real rigidities are common in many 
European countries, and that one source may be high unionization.  To the extent that a 
country’s high unemployment stems from real rigidities, it can be tackled only by 
addressing underlying determinants of the rigidities, not by adjusting monetary policy.   35
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Figure 1a 
Standard deviation of log wage change 
versus median observed log wage change for dataset-year (with linear fit)
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Figure 1b 
Demeaned log standard deviation of log wage change 
versus median observed log wage change for dataset-year (with linear fit)
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Figure 2b: Wage Change Distribution
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Figure 3  
Comparison of MMM country measures of downward nominal rigidity with 
measures in previous studies 
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Real and Nominal Ridigity by Country




These are the MMM estimates of r (the prevalence of downward real wage rigidity) and n 
(the prevalence of downward nominal wage rigidity), averaged across all dataset-years 
for each country. 
By construction, the measures range from 0 (where no one is subject to the rigidity) to 1 
(where all workers are potentially affected).   43
Figure 5 





















Sources and definitions: 
Aggregate EPL: OECD (2004), Index of the strictness of employment protection legislation, Categorical 
variable coded 0 to 6, where 6 is most restrictive.  
Corporatism: Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998), Wage-bargaining corporatism index, summary 
measure of collective bargaining structures of centralization and coordination, Categorical variable 
coded 1= low to 3 =high.  
Union Density: Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998), The proportion of workers who are members of a 
trade union, in percent. 
Wage Indexation: Checchi and Lucifora (2002), Categorical variables coded 0 to 1, where 1 represents the 
presence of automatic wage indexation clauses for most sectors, updated for Belgium and extended to 
include Greece and the United States. 
Bargaining Coverage: OECD (2004), the extent to which salaried workers are subject to union-negotiated 
terms and conditions of employment, in percent, extended to include Greece and Ireland. 
Minimum Wage/Average Wage: Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998), Ratio of gross statutory minimum 
wage relative to average wage; supplemented by the Kaitz measure in Checchi and Lucifora (2002) 
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Figure 6 

























Sources and definitions: 
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Will the dispersion of wage 
changes rise with inflation? 
Will wage change 
distribution show 




Yes:  more inflation reduces the 
number of  nominal wage freezes 
and allows more wage changes 
below the mean wage change 
Yes:  skewed right, nominal 
wage freezes cause spike at 
zero wage change 
Real rigidity: 
Downward real wage 
rigidity 
No:  if inflation expectations are 
widely shared, the entire 
distribution shifts with expected 
inflation   
Yes:  if coverage is sparse or 
disagreement about expectations 
rises with inflation 
Yes:  skewed right, real 
wage freezes cause high 
concentration of wage 
changes around the expected 
inflation rate 
Sand effect: 
Adjustment lags and 
errors 
Yes:  inflation adds more errors 
and lags to the variation in firms’ 
wage changes 
No:  errors and lags are 
assumed to be symmetric 
 
Note:  These effects contrast with a fully flexible wage-setting regime that is assumed to 
produce wage changes that are symmetrical and unaffected by the rate of inflation.   46
Table 2 
IWFP Dataset Characteristics 
 Total  Average 
Countries 16   
Datasets  31  Datasets per country   1.9 
Data-set-years 360 Years  per  dataset  11.6 
Wage changes observed  27.6 million  Observations per dataset-year  76 thousand 
 
 
Country Dataset Years  Source  Earnings 
or wages  Hours  Firm 
identifiers? 
1.  Austria Social  Security 1972-1998  Register  Annual 
earnings 
No Yes 
2.  Belgium Social  Security  1978-1985  Register Annual 
earnings 
No Yes 





1990-2001  Employer 
survey 
Wages Yes  Yes 
The Confederation of 
Finnish Industry and 
Employers (Manual) 
1985-2000  Employer 
survey 
Wages Yes  Yes 
4.  Finland 
The Confederation of 
Finnish Industry and 
Employers (Non-
manual) 
1985-2000  Employer 
survey 







Register  Annual 
earnings 
Yes No  5.  France 
French Labor Survey  1994-2000  Household 
survey 
Earnings Yes  No 




1975-1996 Register  Earnings  No  No 
7.  Italy  Istituto Nazionale per 
la Previdenza Sociale 
(INPS) 








1987-1998  Employer 
survey 






1981-1997  Employer 
survey 
Wages Yes  No 
   47
Table 2, continued 
 
IWFP Dataset Characteristics 
 
Country  Dataset  Years Source  Earnings 
or wages  Hours  Firm 
identifiers? 
9.  Portugal   Quadros de Pessoal  1991-2000  Employer 
survey 







Wages Yes  Yes  10.  Sweden 
Swedish Enterprises 
(White Collar) 
1995-2003  Employer 
survey 
Wages Yes  Yes 
Social Insurance 
Files (SIF) 
1988-1999 Register Annual 
earnings 
No No  11.  Switzerland 
Swiss Labor Force 
Survey 
1992-1999  Household 
survey 
Wages No  No 
12.  U.K.  National 
Employment Survey 
1976-2000  Employer 
survey 
Earnings Yes  No 
Employment Cost 
Index* 
1981-2003  Employer 
survey 
Earnings Yes  Yes  13.  U.S. 
Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics 
1970-1997  Household 
survey 















1993-2001  Household 
survey 
Earnings Yes  No 
 
Notes:  
*Not individual data. Not used in analysis of wage rigidity. 
**Suitable ECHP data for the analysis are available for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom, available years vary 




Combined Effect of Downward Nominal and Real Wage Rigidity on Unemployment 
 
 
Dependent variable   
Unemployment   Change in 
inflation 
Unemployment  effect  (b/a)  1.26 0.90 2.99 2.90 
(standard  error)  (0.35) (0.32) (1.28) (2.09) 
p for null hypothesis 0 ≥ b/a (one tail test)  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.08 





The equations estimated are as follows:   
 
πt = πt
e + c - a Ut + b St + xt + εt 
Ut = St b/a + [c +xt - (πt - πt
e)]/a + μt 
where  
πt = price inflation at time t  
πt
e = expected price inflation at time t 
c = a constant  
Ut = unemployment rate at time t  
St = estimated wage effects of rigidity = MMM estimate of the rise in the average 
wage change caused by rigidities in that year (that is, the increase in the nominal 
wages received by those constrained by downward nominal or real rigidity as a 
result of wage rigidity, multiplied by their share of the wage bill in year t) 
xt = effects of supply shocks controlled for by annual intercepts 
εt = other unobserved factors affecting the rate of inflation, and 
μt = other unobserved factors affecting the unemployment rate.  
 
Dataset intercepts are also included in all specifications. 










Independent variables  Dependent variable: MMM estimate of underlying 
standard deviation of log wage adjustments 
Expected inflation   -.053 
(-0.42) 
Expected inflation
2  .003 
(0.28) 
Inflation surprise  .165 
(1.74) 
Inflation surprise
2  -.009 
(-0.20) 
Productivity growth   .170 
(1.64) 
Productivity growth
2   -.020 
(-1.18) 
Within-group R
2  0.0202 
 
Notes:  
Regressions include dataset specific intercepts.   
T-statistics in parentheses.  
Expected inflation is generated using an MA3 process.  
N=360. 
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Appendix A.  How Are Wage Changes Distributed?   
A-I.  Tests of normality  
  We find strikingly consistent evidence across countries and time that wages are 
quite prone to nominal freezes across years, and if not, are more likely to have wage 
changes that either cluster around the median or are more extreme than would be 
predicted if wage changes had a normal distribution.  The normal distribution is a 
reasonable baseline for comparison because the central limit theorem tells us that any 
phenomena influenced in an additive fashion by a large number of independent factors 
will tend to be normally distributed, no matter how the factors affecting it are distributed.  
However, for wage changes, a two-sided Weibull distribution consistently fits much 
better. 
Figure A-1 shows a typical distribution (for the US in 1997) of wage changes (in 
percentage points) plotted along with a normal distribution fit to the actual distribution
19. 
The bars show the concentration of observations in cells that are one percentage point in 
width (for example, from -5% to -4%, +7% to +8%, etc.), with three exceptions that 
isolate wage freezes.  The exceptions are the cell centered at zero and the two cells 
immediately adjacent, which have the following boundaries:  -1.0% to -0.017%, -0.017% 
to +0.017%, and +0.017% to +1.0%. 
Figure 1
Normal Distribution vs. Actual Percentage Wage 


































































































                                                 
19 The mean of the normal is set equal to the median of the actual distribution and the standard deviation is 
set equal to the square-root of the average squared deviation of observations above the median from the 
median (or the standard deviation computed using only observations from the upper-tail).Our reasons for 
doing this are explained below.  A-2 
As can be seen in Figure A-1, wage changes are not normally distributed.  There 
are three key divergences from the normal distribution.  
 
1.  Too many people had wage freezes, creating a large spike at zero.  If the 
distribution were normal, very few changes would fall in the narrow (-0.017% to 
+0.017%) interval around zero, instead of the large share observed.  
2.  Workers’ wage changes are tightly clustered around the median change.  This 
clustering makes the distribution much more peaked than the normal.   
3.  Although one cannot see this in figure 1, more people have extreme wage changes 
than predicted by normality.  That is, the distribution has fat tails. The absolute 
errors are not large, but the proportional errors are huge because the predicted 
fractions become essentially zero long before the actual fractions do. 
 
These divergences also apply to nearly every case in the IWFP.  Of 269 annual 
wage change distributions
20 observed, we fail to reject the normal distribution at the 
0.001 level in all but one case, where there were relatively few observations.  The median 
Χ
2 is 239,102 with 75 degrees of freedom.
21  Figure A-1 and the possibility of downward 
rigidities suggest that the distribution is closer to normal on the upper tail.  However, 
when we fit the normal only to values above the median, we still reject normality in all 
but five cases. The median Χ
2 statistic is 26,245 (with approximately 45 degrees of 
freedom).
22   
Strikingly, the pattern of divergences from normality is quite consistent across the 
                                                 
20 These are the distributions that can be constructed without using annual earnings data. 
21 The mean (median) sum of squared errors is 0.039 (0.019). 
22 The mean (median) sum of squared errors is 0.035 (0.009). 
Figure 2
Average Error  269 Wage Change Distributions 










































disparate IWFP datasets.  Figure A-2 shows the average error in each cell for all 269 
wage change distributions. We see the under prediction of the cells immediately around 
the median and the over prediction of cells in the intermediate ranges, as well as under 
prediction of the extreme tails and the significant tendency to under predict the spike at 
zero. 
 
A-II.  The Two-Sided Weibull 
 
If the distribution of wage changes is not normal, what alternative distribution 
yields a better approximation?  One possibility is the 2-sided Weibull distribution, which 
has three parameters.  This distribution nests the two-parameter, two-sided exponential 
distribution as a special case when the parameter determining peakedness is equal to 1, 
but allows a more peaked distribution with fatter tails as its third parameter declines.  
When applied to entire wage change distributions, the 2-sided Weibull fits wage changes 
considerably better than the normal.  The quality of the fit improves even more 
dramatically when we look only at the upper tail.  Despite very large sample sizes, we 
now fail to reject the distribution at the 0.001 level in 86 cases or 31% of the time.  The 
median Χ
2 drops to 916, while the mean and median sums of squared errors fall to 0.007 
and 0.001, respectively.  The tendency to over predict observations in cells just above the 
median and under predict those in the intermediate range is nearly gone. In contrast to the 
fit of the upper tail, there are still notable problems to the fit of the lower tail. There is 
still under prediction of values just below the median and over prediction of values more 
than 4 percentage points below the median.  
While these tendencies are not particularly notable in figure A-3 (the fit for the 
US in 1997), they are in figure A-4, which shows the 2-Sided Weibull plotted against the 
actual distribution for the United Kingdom in 1985.  The prevalence of wage freezes is 
weak in this distribution, but there is a notable concentration of wage adjustments in the 
three cells just below the median and a paucity of wage changes below those rates. 
Inflation in the UK had been in the range of 4 to 5% in the previous two years and rose to 
6% in 1985, so it is not unreasonable to assume that the spikes at those values in the 







































































































































































Appendix B.  Estimating Wage Rigidity for the International Wage 
Flexibility Project Using the Mixed Method of Moments (MMM) 
Estimator 
 
William T. Dickens, The Brookings Institution 
 
Lorenz Goette, University of Zurich 
 
Introduction 
Nearly all previous attempts to use cross national data to assess the causes and 
consequences of wage rigidity have relied on estimates derived from macro data.
23 
Typically these studies have estimated Phillips curve relationships and interpreted 
differences in the sensitivity of inflation to unemployment as indicative of the extent of 
wage rigidity (the less sensitive the more rigid wages are). Such an approach assumes 
wage rigidity takes the form of slow adjustment of wages to economic fundamentals. 
However, several other sources of wage rigidity have been suggested. Downward 
nominal wage rigidity only slows adjustment under certain circumstances and is likely 
due to different causes than generalized slow adjustment. Minimum wages or national 
bargains are yet other kinds of rigidity, and menu costs one more. The presence of one or 
more of these other types of rigidity could complicate or invalidate studies attempting to 
measure slow adjustment using macro data. 
  The initial phase of the International Wage Flexibility Project suggests an 
alternative to studies that use macro data.  Twelve country teams have access to micro 
data on individual earnings. Examination of distributions of individual earnings changes 
for the 12 countries for a number of years suggests that it may be possible to identify the 
presence and importance of a number of different types of rigidity using micro data on 
individual wage changes. Wage change distributions differ considerably across countries 
and even across time within some countries.  It is possible that if we can find ways to 
summarize and quantify these differences in the wage change distribution that we will be 
able to identify measures of the extent of different types of wage rigidity and to relate 
them to their causes and consequences in a cross-country-time-series analysis. Doing this 
may contribute significantly to our understanding of how wage rigidity affects economic 
outcomes and the institutional sources of rigidity.  
  However, before we can measure wage rigidity using wage change distributions 
we need an accurate measure of the distribution of wage changes. In nearly all the 
datasets available to the IWFP the observed measure of earnings is distorted either by 
reporting and recording error, by an absence of accurate data on time worked to 
compliment earnings data, or by a divergence between the concept of wages we wish to 
measure and what is available (for example average hourly earnings including overtime 
when we would want base wage). To deal with these problems we need a way to 
                                                 
23 See Holden and Wulfsberg (2004) for a recent exception. Several other efforts related to this project have 
been circulated in recent years as well.   
  B-2
transform the observed wage change distribution into an estimate of the true distribution 
without errors. 
  Section B-I of this appendix describes an estimator for a semi-non-parametric 
representation of the underlying wage change distribution and for the parameters of the 
error process, and an estimator for the variance covariance-matrix of the parameters and 
of rigidity measures based on them. We dub this estimator a mixed method-of-moments 
estimator or MMM. The likelihood function for the problem is computationally 
intractable, given available resources. There is certainly more information available than 
needed for a just identified method-of-moments estimator, but estimation of the model by 
generalized-method-of-moments would be impractical given the computing resources 
available to the IWFP teams. The MMM estimator solves the problem of computational 
complexity by concentrating out the estimates of the parameters of the true wage change 
distribution and the one time varying parameter of the error distribution. Given the other 
parameters of the model it is possible to solve for these moments exactly. We then use an 
iterative process to minimize a GLS distance measure for the remaining moments which 
are much fewer in number and a function of only three parameters.  
  With these new estimates of the true wage change distribution we turn to the task 
of estimating the extent of different types of rigidity. We have developed four different 
ways to measure the extent of rigidity using distributions of wage changes. What is 
needed is some way of knowing what the distribution of wages would look like in the 
absence of rigidity and then that can be compared to the actual distribution. Candidate 
methods for establishing the counterfactual of what the distribution would look like in the 
absence of rigidity are:  
1.  assume a particular form for the distribution and estimate a model of the true 
wage change distribution based on it,  
2.   assume that the effects of rigidity are seen only below the median and that the 
distribution would be symmetric in the absence of rigidity, 
3.  assume that the notional wage change distribution is fixed over time except for a 
changing mean, 
4.  assume that in the absence of changes in the extent of rigidity certain aspects of 
the wage change distribution are constant (such as skew, kurtosis, smoothness). 
 
We tried all four, but settled on the first as providing the most reliable estimates. 
  The methods described in sections B-I and B-II will not work if the proxy for 
wages is annual earnings divided by annual hours. Unless the typically annual wage 
change takes place at the same time as the survey, a year’s income reflects two different 
wages. This causes two problems. First, it induces a positive correlation between the 
change in earnings in one year and in the next year which violates one of the important 
assumptions of the error correction model. Second, the change in income from one year 
to the next confounds two changes in wages. So, for example, someone would have to go 
two years without a wage change in order to have no change in annual income for two 
years (unless the wage change was synchronized with the period of observation for 
income). Section B-III describes methods for adapting both our error correction model 
and the method that estimates rigidity using an ideal distribution to the case where we 
only observe annual income.   
  B-3
  Finally, a note at the end of the appendix presents a list of the notation used in the 
first three sections, definitions of variables and parameters and a list of the page in the 
text where each is defined. 
  
B-I.  MMM Estimator for True Distribution 
Our first attempt to develop parametric rigidity estimates using ML was not 
completely successful. That estimator could identify the extent of measurement error only 
because we assumed that we knew the form of the distribution of the notional wage 
changes and the measurement error. However, the non-normality of the notional wage 
change distribution – and probably also the error distribution – made this identification 
suspect. In particular, the identification of the extent of measurement error in the ML 
estimator probably depends on conditions on high order moments that are very sensitive 
to treatment of observations in the tails of the distribution. It would be good if this could 
be avoided. 
While it is not possible to estimate the model without making some use of 
distributional assumptions, it is possible to estimate the true wage change distribution 
semi-non-parametrically with relatively innocuous distributional assumptions if we can 
assume that the only source of auto-correlation in wage changes is measurement error. 
Such an assumption allows us to identify measurement error variance without 
distributional assumptions. Only relatively minor distributional assumptions are then 
necessary to separately identify the frequency of the error and the variance of the error 
when it is made.  
The assumption that all auto correlation in changes in log wages is due to 
measurement error is suggested by the findings of Abowd and Card (1989) who show 
that the best characterization of the stochastic process generating individual wages in US 
panel data is an ARIMA(0,1,1) – a process which is MA1 in first differences. 
Measurement error with no serial correlation added to a random walk will generate this 
sort of process. Since all the covariance in wage changes is due to the MA1 process, the 
assumption that the measurement error is the only source of serial correlation in wage 
changes is tantamount to assuming that any observed wage change that goes away within 
a year was an error. This is probably a reasonable point of departure for attempts to 
estimate the true wage change distribution. Calculations based on Bound and Krueger’s 
(1999) estimates of the extent of measurement error in US survey data suggest that error 
could be sufficient to explain all the negative correlation between wage changes observed 
in datasets such as the PSID.
24  
                                                 
24 Their estimated ratio of noise to signal plus noise in wage changes for men is 85% of our estimate for the 
PSID for 1987-89 (Table 6  "Classical measurement error"). Bound and Krueger also find a significant 
positive correlation in the errors in adjacent periods and a negative correlation between errors and wage 
levels for men. Both correlations are inconsequential for women. The presence of a positive correlation in 
the errors would lead us to underestimate the true extent of wage variance. Their point estimates suggest 
an underestimate of about 20 percent. If errors in levels are also correlated with changes in wages our 
estimated true wage distributions likely have more variance than the true distribution. Also, if this 
correlation exists the total variance of wage changes would be less than the sum of the signal and noise 
variance. Bound and Krueger don't report the variance of log wage changes in their data, but under the 
assumption that wages are a random walk it is possible to estimate the variance as the variance of the 
signal minus the covariance of the signal in adjacent years. The ratio of the noise to this variance is 60%  
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Further, we have now analyzed data produced by Gottschalk (forthcoming). He 
uses a regression discontinuity model in a dataset with multiple wage observations a year 
for each person to separate true wage changes from errors.
25 We have computed the auto-
correlation of his estimated true wage changes and find a statistically insignificant value 
of .006. If the assumption that true wage changes are uncorrelated is incorrect it probably 
isn’t off by much.  
A Description of the Estimator  
The estimator works as follows. The underlying true change in log wage 
distribution is assumed to be a discrete.  The log wage change variable can take one of 76 
values from -.245 to .495 in steps of .01 or it can take the value zero. The histogram of 
observed wage changes for each pair of years in the data is calculated with the number of 
histogram cells in each year equal to the number of elements in the underlying discrete 
distribution. If wages are measured with error that is uncorrelated from year to year, the 
error will produce a negative covariance between wage changes in adjacent years. The 
magnitude of this covariance will depend on the frequency and the variance of the errors. 
We make an initial guess at the two parameters determining the frequency of errors and 
use them, and the auto-covariances, to compute the implied variance of the error in each 
period.  
With an initial guess at the parameters of the error distribution, the estimates of 
the variance of the error distribution, and an assumption that errors, when made, are 
drawn from a two-sided Weibull distribution
26, it is possible to compute the fraction of 
observations associated with each element of the true (discrete) change-in-log-wage 
distribution that can be expected to be found in each cell of the observed histogram of log 
wage changes. These fractions can be arranged into a matrix with each row representing 
the fraction of the observations associated with each element of the discrete true change 
distribution that is expected to be found in each cell of the histogram of observed changes. 
One can then represent the expected number of observations in each cell of the histogram 
as the result of multiplying that matrix times the vector which contains the fraction of 
observations at each point in the discrete true change distribution. By inverting the matrix 
and multiplying it times the vector of the fraction of observations in each cell of the 
histogram one can estimate the fraction of observations generated by each element of the 
discrete true change-in-log-wage distribution.  
Now we need some way to check our original guess about the frequency of errors 
and the curvature of the error distribution. When a large positive error is made it will at 
first cause a large increase in the observed wage. If errors are not correlated from one 
year to the next, the next year after a large increase due to an error there will likely be a 
large fall in the reported wage. Using the estimated true wage distribution and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
greater than our estimate of this value. Although this is much larger than our estimates, it is for total 
income which is probably measured less precisely than hourly wage (our measure in the PSID). The large 
differences between the error processes for men and women suggest that the model should be estimated 
separately by sex, but when we tried this in several IWFP datasets we found no practical or statistically 
significant differences between men and women. 
25 This method isn't available to us since our country teams have only annual wage observations. 
26 The Weibull distribution has support on interval (0,∞]. The two-sided Weibull has support on the entire 





parameters of the error distribution it is possible to compute the predicted number of such 
changes from one year to the next at several points in the distribution (we call people who 
make such moves “switchers”). We use an iterative process to minimize a quadratic 
distance measure of the difference between the actual and predicted fraction of people 
“switching” from high to low, or low to high, as a function of the remaining parameters. 
In theory we could have any number of such “switcher” moments however the 
cost of computing them is very high. As a compromise between the efficiency from the 
addition of more such moments and computational speed we chose to use two switcher 
moments, one centered around zero (with a switcher being someone who is on different 
sides of zero in the two periods) and one around 1% (with a switcher being someone who 
whose wage change is above 1% in one of the two periods and below it in the other). 
These values were chosen because they showed a fair amount of variation over the 
sample which was not as highly correlated as other values tried (for example zero and 
plus or minus 2% around zero).  
 
Notation and Assumptions 
[The note at the end of this appendix contains a list of all the variable names used in 
these notes, their meaning, and the point in the notes where they are defined.] 



























wit is the natural log of the actual wage for person i at time t, and w
o
it is the natural log of 
the wage for that person at time t observed in the data. The random variable ηit will be 
assumed to be an i.i.d. two-sided Weibull with mean zero and parameters bt and a, μit is 
assumed to be an i.i.d. random variable with a uniform distribution over the interval [-c, 
(1-c)], and τi is assumed to be an i.i.d. random variable with a uniform distribution over 
the interval [p-1, p]
27. We, will also assume that the eits are i.i.d. and drawn from a 
discrete distribution that can take one of K known values which we designate as the K 
length vector q. The probability that any eit is equal to each of the K qjs  is represented as 
the K vector mt* and is not assumed to be known. Since the sum of the elements of mt* 
equals one, only K-1 of them need be estimated. We denote the vector with the last 







it-1 and the vector of such observations in time period t as d
o
t.  
The data used to estimate the model will be log wages for T+1 sequential periods. 
We will denote the first period for which wage data are available period 0 and the last 
period T. Change in log wages will be computed between overlapping pairs of periods (ie. 
period 0 to period 1 and period 1 to period 2). Let Nt denote the number of individuals for 
                                                 
27 This structure for the error – the two-sided Weibull with a fraction of people never making errors – was 
chosen to match the distribution of estimated errors in Gottschalk’s data. His estimated errors had a 
distinctly peaked distribution and showed some auto-correlation in the probability of an error that was 
simply accounted for by having a group of people who didn’t make errors.   
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whom data on wage changes are available from period t-1 to t, and Nt,t+1 will denote the 
number of people with wage change observations between periods t-1 and t and periods t 
and t+1. We will assume that the process generating missing data is random so that no 
bias is imparted by ignoring missing data in computing sample moments.  
Define l and u as K vectors of upper and lower limits to categories of a histogram, 
chosen in advance, for the observed wage change data. Define the K-1 length column 
vector git to have zeros in all positions except j where  uj >d
o
it ≥ lj for j =1 to K-1 (the sum 
of the g vectors across observations yields the frequency count of observations in the 
cells of a histogram). Define Utj and Ltj as pairs of upper and lower limits for defining 
switchers (there will be (T-1)Q with Q being the number of pairs per year). Define hitj as 
equal to 1 if  d
o
it > Utj  and d
o
it+1 < Ltj or if  d
o
it < Ltj and d
o
it+1 > Utj and zero otherwise (a 
one indicating that the observation is a “switcher” in year t).  
  Assuming b0 = b1, and  bT-1 = bT
28 we can define a mixed method of moments 
estimator for a, p, c,   the T-1 bts, and the (K-1)T mts as the values of those parameters 
that solve: 
 
)) , , , | ( ( ˆ ))' , , , | ( ( min
) 1 1 1 , , , | ( 0
) 3 (
1 2 2 1 2 2 , , . . .
1 1
2 p c a v v E v p c a v v E v
and
T to t m and T to t b p c a v E v
v p c a t r w
t t
− Λ −
= ∀ − = ∀ − =
 
 












































t N g v T to t
N


































































                                                 
28 We need a covariance of wage changes to identify b. We restrict the first and last pairs of b to be equal in 
order to allow us to use all the years of data on wage changes we have available. If we didn’t do this we 
would have to restrict estimation of the true wage distribution to years t+1 through T-1 in order to have 
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v Λ  is the sample covariance matrix of v2. 












  This estimator will be consistent, but it will not be efficient. It is equivalent to 
GMM with infinite weight on the v1 moments.   
 
Deriving the Expectations 
First note that 
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Rt.K is the (K-1) vector, the elements of which are defined by (6) for i=1,K-1, and 1K-1 is a 
K-1 vector of ones. In (6)  
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i(.) is an indicator function which returns the value 1 if the condition in parenthesis is true 
and zero otherwise, and w(x|a,b) denotes the two-sided Weibull density. In practice we 
will approximate these integrals (and several more below) using Gauss-Legendre 
quadrature (Judd 1998, p260). 
Next, the covariance is 
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where Γ (x) is the gamma function and σ
2
t is the variance of η in year t. We will 
abbreviate Γ2=Γ (1+2/a). Finally, the expected value of the fraction of switchers is given 
by 
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Solving the Model 
  If we use a 76 element distribution to approximate the true wage change 
distribution, then we only need a couple of years of data before solving for the 2+TK 
parameters using standard non-linear estimation procedures becomes unmanageable. 
However, the form of the problem allows us to solve for the T(K-1) mts as functions of 
the other parameters. Similarly, we can solve for the T-1 bts as functions of the 
covariances and the other parameters. These can then be substituted out of the remaining 
3 equations making a solution practical.  
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Specifically, we can substitute the estimate of m 
 






t K K t t
e



















































t it t it
d d N
d d d d
σ  
 
This leaves only a, c and p to be found by minimizing the quadratic distance 
measure. Since the quadrature formula we use to compute the integrals in (6) and (9) 
causes discontinuities in the derivatives of the objective function we use a modified 
version of Powell’s method, a non-derivative method, to minimize the distance measure. 
Since we encountered a great deal of difficulty with local minimums we started Powell’s 
method from an extensive grid search on all three parameters. 
 
Variance-Covariance Matrix for Parameters 
  To find the covariance matrix for the parameters we linearize and stack the 
solution to the first TK-1 moment conditions and the 3 first order conditions for the 






































































































































































































denotes the derivative of the second set of theoretical moments with respect  
 
to each element of β2 holding constant only the other elements of β2 with the elements of 
β1 concentrated out. Using equation (12) we can approximate the variance-covariance 
matrix of the parameters as  
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Ni is the number of observations used to construct the ith moment and N is the total 
number of individuals in the sample. Missing observations are set equal to their mean so 
that any observation i  with missing values for j  or k  will contribute nothing to the jkth 
covariance. The derivatives of the moments with respect to the parameters can be 
calculated numerically. 
 
B-II.  Estimating Rigidity 
We have previously proposed the following taxonomy of sources of wage 
rigidity: 
Nominal Rigidity 
•  Symmetric rigidity at zero due to menu costs 
•  Asymmetric or downward nominal rigidity or resistance to wage cuts 
 
Real Rigidity 
•  Resistance to real wage cuts or downward real rigidity 
•  Insensitivity of real wages to economic conditions 
 
Institutional Rigidity 
•  Statutory minimum wages, and  
•  Collectively bargained wages. 
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For both types of nominal rigidity and downward real rigidity we can develop 
specific estimates of the fraction of people subject to such rigidity.  
Evidence for rigidity will be discerned by comparing the estimated true wage 
distribution to a counterfactual estimate of what the distribution would look like in the 
absence of the hypothesized rigidity. We have attempted to approach this problem of 
constructing a counter-factual in four ways: 1. assume an ideal type and estimate the 
parameters of the distribution from moments that are assumed not to be affected by 
rigidity (for example the 90
th and 75
th percentile of the distribution), 2. assume that the 
effects of rigidity are seen only below the median and that the distribution would be 
symmetric in the absence of rigidity, 3. assume that the notional wage change distribution 
is fixed over time except for a changing mean, 4. assume that in the absence of changes 
in the extent of rigidity certain aspects of the wage change distribution are constant (such 
as skew, kurtosis, smoothness). However, symmetry based measures could not be 
estimated for many years when reasonable measures of the expected rate of inflation put 
it above the median wage change for several countries. The method of assuming a 
constant wage change distribution (following Kahn 1997) did not work because in many 
countries there was insufficient variation in the median of the distribution to allow us to 
identify the extent of all three types of rigidity. Clear differences emerged between 
countries in several aspects of the shape of the distribution and these were clearly related 
to differences in wage setting institutions, but it proved difficult to relate these aspects of 
the distribution systematically to wage rigidity. Thus we settled on the first method. 
 
Estimates Based on an Ideal Distribution 
Examination of both the estimated true distributions we have seen so far in 
developing the estimator, and an analysis of Gottschalk's estimates of true wages, 
suggests that wage changes have a distribution that is both more peaked and has fatter 
tails than the normal. The half of the distribution above the median appears to be well 
approximated by a Weibull distribution. The lower tail, in countries where real rigidity 
does not appear to be much of a problem, seems to be a mirror image of the upper tail for 
those parts that are above zero when the distribution is not affected by real rigidity. Thus 
it seems reasonable to model the notional wage change distribution as symmetric with the 
shape of a Weibull. 
The Weibull is a three parameter distribution with support on the positive real 
numbers with cumulative distribution function P(d<x) = 1-exp(-([x-μ]/at)
c
t) where μ, a 
and c are the parameters. If it is assumed that the notional wage change density is 








t). The integral of this density (excluding the singularity at x=μ) yields the 
cumulative wage change distribution for the two-sided Weibull. Denote that cumulative 
distribution function for period t Ft(x). 
We assume that the true wage change is determined from the notional wage 
change by the following process. Person i’s notional wage change in period t d
n
it will be a 
draw from the distribution for period t. From the notional wage change the notional real 
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it is a normally distributed random variable with mean π
e
t  and variance 
e
t
π σ (with cumulative distribution function in period t Φt(x)) representing the expected 
rate of inflation determining this wage, ε
r
it is an i.i.d. random variable that is drawn from 
a uniform distribution on the unit interval, and ρt is the probability of an individual being 
subject to downward real wage rigidity if the notional wage is less than the expected rate 
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it, are all uniform distributed random variables with support on the 
unit interval, nt is the probability of being subject to downward nominal rigidity if one’s 
notional real adjusted wage is less than zero, and s1t and s2t are the probability of being 
subject to symmetric nominal rigidity if notional real adjusted wage changes are close 
enough to zero. Unless the true wage change is zero, it is then rounded to its nearest 
masspoint in the sequence {-.245, -.235, …, .485, .495}. 
Given this model of wage changes we represent the expected mass at each point 
in m
c
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and uj = (.01)(j+1) and lj = (.01)j for j<0 and uj = (.01)j and lj = (.01)(j-1) for j>0. 
The xjt represents the fraction of notional real adjusted wages that would fall in 
interval j of the histogram if there was no downward or symmetric nominal rigidity. This 
is the fraction of notional wage changes that would fall in the interval (Ft(uj)-Ft(lj)) times 
the fraction of people in that interval not affected by real rigidity. Those will include 
people whose ε
r
it is too large as well as those whose ε
r
it<ρt but whose expected rate of 
inflation lies below the lower end of the interval. This is added to the fraction of people 
subject to real rigidity whose expected rate of inflation falls in the interval and whose 
notional wage change is in or below the interval. 
  This model can be estimated by GMM using the estimated m
cs as the observed 
moments and their covariance matrix as the weights. We estimate the model for each year 
for each dataset used in the project. The program described below also allows structural 
break modeling to choose sub-periods over which to estimate the model holding rigidity 
parameters constant. In some years in some datasets where real rigidity is relatively 
unimportant the estimator tries to use the real rigidity regime to create a denser upper tail 
than that predicted by the symmetric Weibull. To avoid this we specify relatively narrow 
ranges for the expected inflation parameter based on actual inflation and simple 
predictions of inflation.  
 
B-III.  Annual Income Data 
When instead of wage observations we observe annual income we have two 
additional problems. First, if all wage changes aren’t exactly synchronized with the 
period over which income is observed the overlap of the effects of wage changes from 
one year to the next will cause positive auto-covariance in the observed wage changes 
which will prevent us from using the error correction method used for wages. This can be 
seen if we assume that each person gets at most one wage change a year and define 
income as  
 
(18)   yit = xi wit-1 + (1-xi) wit 
 
where wit is person i’s  wage at time t and xi is the fraction of the year that passes before a 
wage change takes place. With this, if observed income is written as  
 
(19)   y
o
it = yit + η’it 
 
the observed change in income from one year to the next will be 
 
(20)   d
y0
it = xi eit-1 + (1-xi) eit + η’it - η’it-1 
 
where eit is the innovation in wages in period t and  η’it is the observation error in period 
t. As with wages the presence of the observation error will tend to induce negative 
autocorrelation in the income data, but the presence of the lagged wage innovation will  
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tend to induce an offsetting positive autocorrelation as long as the wage change isn’t 
synchronized with the wage change (x=0 or x=1).  
Using income data produces another problem as well. The confounding of two 
wage change distributions in each income change distribution makes it impossible to use 
any of the measures of rigidity proposed in the last section. Here we propose solutions to 
both problems. 
Correcting the Income Change Histogram 
The same general correction technique can be used, but another method must be 
found to estimate the parameters of the error distribution used to compute the correction 
matrix. For the wage change histogram correction we used the auto-covariance and 
counts of the number of switchers, but the positive auto-correlation of the income 
changes makes the computation of the expected number of switchers intractable. 
However, similar information can be recovered from the auto-covariance of higher order 
moments. If these are used we must also use higher order moments of the wage changes 
to identify some higher order moments of the error and wage change distribution. Thus 
we propose to use the following six moments, constructed for each year and pair of years 
for which we have data in order to identify the parameters of the error distribution. Those 
moments and their expected values are (dropping the subscripts and superscripts on d
yo
it 
except for those denoting the time period): 
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where the ωs are fraction of the population with wage changes in each month and, 
assuming that wage changes take place only on the first of each month, xj = (j-1)/12, 
where all observations are made on the first of the first month. As with the wage change 
model we assume that errors are made by a fraction (1-p) of the population with 




ηt (1-p)ct.  Given our sample sizes we will 
ignore the terms of order 1/N










themselves functions of other parameters we will estimate. We assume that the errors 
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et can be computed 
recursively given the parameters of the true income change distribution and the initial 
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ηt, ct-1, ct and p.  
The empirical counterparts to these theoretical moments are: 
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The second and fourth moment can be computed for each year, and the other four 
moments can be computed for each pair of years giving 6T-4 moments to compute 2T+6 
parameters. If there are inadequate numbers of moments, restrictions can be imposed on 
the parameters.   
To estimate the parameters of the error distribution we minimize the distance 
measure  
 
*) * ( ˆ *)' * ( ) 24 (
1 T E V T E − −
−   
 
with respect to the 2T+6 parameters where E* is a 6T-4 vector of empirical moments, T* 
is the conforming vector of corresponding theoretical moments, and V ˆ is the empirical 
covariance matrix of the moments.  
 
Estimating Rigidity 
The fact that each income change reflects two wage changes, unless the period of 
observation is synchronized with the period of the wage change, makes it impossible to 
use any of the symmetry based estimates. However, the ideal distribution based estimator 
can be extended to deal with annual income data.  
If we assume that the underlying wage change densities are the same for each 
month of the year for which an observation is made, that the densities are piecewise 
uniform in one percentage point change increments (except for a mass point at zero 
which will be treated in what follows as an infinitesimal interval), and if we continue to 
assume that wage changes are independent, then the expected fraction of observations of 
the true income change distribution in each cell of a histogram can be represented as  
(25)           m
y
t = Ψ vec(mt-1 mt’), 
where vec is a function which turns a KxK matrix into a K
2x1 vector and Ψ is a KxK
2 
matrix with elements 
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where l and u are the upper and lower bounds for cells of a K length histogram. Under the 
assumption that et is piecewise uniform Ψ will depend only on the weights ω thus 
allowing the representation of m
y
t in (31).  
For the case with 75 1-percentage-point-wide cells and a mass point at zero in 
position 26 of the histogram the elements of Ψ can be computed as  
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(34) P[li <dt
y <ui |lk <et <uk,ll <et−1 <ul,xj]=
if (ui −xjll)/(1−xj)<lk or (li −xjul)/( 1−xj)≥uk 0
if lk ≤(ui −xjll)/( 1−xj)<uk and (ui −xjul)/( 1−xj)<lk
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Using the Ψ matrix defined this way it is possible to compute the expected 
distribution of changes in income given the ideal distribution models of the wage change 
distribution allowing GMM estimation of the underlying parameters.  
To construct the Ψ matrix requires knowledge of the distribution of wage changes 
over the months of the year.  Different IWFP teams used different methods to obtain this 
information. The Swiss conducted a small labor force survey. Several countries had data 
on the timing of wage changes in contracts, and others used employer surveys.   
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To avoid having to estimate parameters for all wage change distributions 
simultaneously we made the assumption that the relevant wage change distributions for 
year t and t-1 where identical and estimated the model for each year separately.  
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Notation for Appendix B 
Duplication of variable and parameter names has been avoided in the first two 
sections, but some duplication was unavoidable in the section on rigidity estimates. The 
page number in parenthesis after each definition tells where in the text the symbol is 
defined and first used.    
 
a  parameter of the 2 sided Weibull distribution that determines curvature (p4 
footnote) 
at  scaling parameter for the Weibull density used to model the true change in log 
wage distribution (p11) 
bt  parameter of the 2 sided Weibull distribution that scales the argument (p4 
footnote) 
Bt(x)  the integral of the product of two two-sided Weibull distributions (p7) 
c  parameter of the error distribution that is equal to the probability that someone 
who is prone to errors makes one (p5)  
ct  the curvature parameter of the true change in log wage distribution for one of the 
rigidity estimators (p11) 
Ct()  function yielding the integral of three two-sided Weibull densities (p8) 




it  the change in person is observed log wage between t and t-1 (dt
o is the Nt vector 
of the dit
o
 s) (p5) 
d
y
it  the change in person is observed income between t and t-1 (dt
y is the Nt vector of 
the dit
y
 s) (p14) 
Dj()  function yielding the integral of two two-sided Weibull densities (p8) 
eit  log wage change for person i from period t-1 to period t (p5) 
E*  a 6T-4 vector of empirical moments used to estimate the income model (p16) 
E()   expectation operator (p7)  
ft(x)  the density for the true change in log wage distribution in period t (p11) 
Ft(x)  cumulative 2-sided Weibul distribution function for true wage changes in period t 
(p11) 
git  a K-1 length column vector that is zero except in the position corresponding to 
person is period t wage change (where it equals 1) (p6) 
hitj  a variable equal to 1 if person i is defined as a switcher by criteria j in period t 
(zero otherwise) (p6) 
i  index number normally differentiating individuals (p5) 
j  index number normally differentiating elements of a vector (p5) 
K  the number of discrete mass points in the true wage change distribution (p5) 
l  a K vector of lower bounds for wage change categories (p6) 
Lt  the number of constraints imposed on the estimated wage change distribution (p8) 
Ltj  The lower limit for the jth definition of switchers in period t (p6) 
mt  a K-1 vector giving the probability that any eit is equal to each of the first K-1 qs 
(p5) 
mt*  a K vector that has mt as the first K-1 elements and one minus the sum of the 
other elements as the last element (p5)  
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mt
e*  a K vector that has m
e
t as the first K-1 elements and one minus the sum of the 
other elements as the last element (p15) 
m
c
t  the K-1 vector of constrained estimates of m (p12) 
m
e
t  the K-1 vector of estimated ms (p9) 
m
o
t  the K-1 vector of observed ms (p7) 
m
y
t  the K-1 vector of true ms for income (p16) 
M  a matrix of coefficients in a linear expansion of the estimator’s normal equations 
(p9) 
Nt  the number of observed wage changes between period t and t-1 (p5) 
Nj  the number of observations used to construct the jth moment (p10) 
Nt,t+1  the number of individuals with observed wage changes in both period t and t+1 
(p6) 
nt  parameter for the fraction of observations affected by DNWR and DRWR in 
period t (p12) 
O(X)  an abbreviation for “additional terms of order X”. (p14) 
p  parameter of the error distribution that determines the probability that someone is 
not prone to reporting errors (p5) 
qj  location of the jth element of the true wage distribution (p5) 
Q  the number of ways in which switchers are measured (p6) also the set of cells 
around the expected rate of inflation in the Kahn estimator (p17) 
Rtij  an element of the KxK matrix Rt whose ijth element is the probability that an true 
wage change of qj will be observed in the ith range of the empirical frequency 
distribution in period t (when subscripted only with t the matrix is K-1xK-1 
leaving out the last row and column, when subscripted t.K it is a K-1 vector 
containing the last column) (p7) 
Stij  an element of the matrix St which is used to compute the expected number of 
switchers in period t (p8) 
s1t  parameter for the fraction unaffected by menu costs within one percent of zero 
(p12) 
s2t  parameter for the fraction of wage changes unaffected by menu costs within two 
percent of zero but more one percent  (p12) 
t  index number for time period (p5) 
T  the number of periods for which wage changes are measured (one minus the 
number of periods for which wages are measured (p5) 
T*  a 6T-4 vector of theoretical moments used in estimating the income model (p16) 
u  a K vector of upper bounds for wage change categories (p6) 
Utj  The upper limit for the jth definition of switchers in period t (p6) 
v1  a TK-1 vector of the moments (when a t subscript is present it is the subvector 
containing only those parameters for year t) (p6) 
v2  a vector with the elements a, p, and α (p6) 
wit    log of person is true wage in period t   (p5) 
w
o
it    log of person is observed wage in period t   (p5) 
w()  two-sided Weibull density function (p7) 
Wt(x)  integral of the two-sided Weibull from minus infinity to x (p7) 
xi  the fraction of the year that passes before person i gets his/her annual wage 
change (p13)  
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yit  true annual income for person i in year t (p13) 
y
o
it  observed annual income for person i in year t (p13) 
Z  a matrix of coefficients in the linear expansion of the normal equations for the 
estimator (p9) 
β  a vector that stacks all the parameters of the model (subscripts 1 and 2 denote 
particular subsets of the parameters) (p9) 
Φt(x)  cumulative normal distribution with mean and variance appropriate for time t 
(p11) 
Γ(x)  the gamma function (the integral from zero to one with respect to t of the function 
ln(1/t)^(x-1) (Γ2  is used to designate Γ(1+2/a)) (p8) 
ηit  measurement error in the log wage of person i in period t if there is measurement 
error (p5) 
η’it  actual measurement error in log wage in period t (p5) 
Λ  the covariance matrix of the empirical moments (p6) 
μ  the mean of the true change in log wage distribution  (p11) 
μit  uniform random variable on [-ct,(1-ct)] which determines whether a person prone 
to errors makes one in period t (p5) 
π
e
t  parameter for the expected rate of inflation in period t (p11) 
ρt  parameter for the fraction of observations affected by real rigidity (p11) 
σ
2
t  variance of η (the error when an error is made) (p7) 
σ
2
x  variance of variable x (p14) 
σ
2
x,y  covariance of variables x and y (p9) 
τi  uniform random variable on [-p,(1-p)] which determines whether a person is 
prone to errors in reporting wages (p5) 
ωj  the fraction of people who receive wage changes in month j (p14) 
Ψi,j  element i,j of a KxK
2 matrix Ψ used to combine two annual wage change 
histogram frequency vectors into a single annual income change histogram vector 
(p16) 
Ω  covariance matrix of the model parameters (p10) 
 